Macedonia towards the EU: whether and how much prevention matters by Lidija Georgieva & Marina Mitrevska
JULY - DECEMBER 2004 SOUTHEAST EUROPE ON THE WAY INTO THE EU 1-=--2~7
Macedonia towards the EU:
Whether and How Much
Prevention Matters
Lidija Georgieva and Marina Mitrevska*
Original paper
UDC 327(497.7:061.1 EU)
Received in May 2005
Since its formal independence from the former Yugoslavia in 1991, the Republic of Macedo-
nia was a subject of different conflict prevention strategies utilized by numerous interna-
tional institutions or particular western democracies. Trapped in the constant balancing
between regional and internal challenges for peace and stability and periodically supported
in its avoidance of violent scenarios, Macedonia was labelled the most successful case of
conflict prevention or as a successful case of crisis prevention, later (since 2001), by the
numerous international representatives. Different arguments were used in order to support
such assessments. The main argument is that the violence that was experienced in other ex-
Yugoslav conflicts did not emerge. Such an argument could be accepted as the essential only
if the main objective of specific international institutions preventive strategies were defined
as violence avoidance or management thereby supporting only restrictive preventive ap-
proach. However, to keep the country on the razor s edge while balancing the stability by
means of the instruments for operational conflict prevention could be hazardous approach.
Instead, long-term strategy for structural prevention towards the region in general and
towards the Republic of Macedonia in particular is required.
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1. Introduction
The processes of accession and integration of
the region and the Republic of Macedonia into the
European Union have been seen as a core stabilizing
and comprehensive preventive approach. This is not
because some believe that integration is magic solu-
tion for complex regional and internal challenges,
but because of publicly shared confidence that
mainstreaming of democratic norms and standards,
respect for the rule of law, strengthening of demo-
cratic institutions through this process, will bring
peace, stability and development. Although the will-
ingness to integrate the country into the EU had been
. Institute for Defence and Peace Studies, Faculty of Philoso-
phy, Skopje
demonstrated earlier (Macedonia with aide-memo ire
in 1992 asked for European Agreement), Macedo-
nia became PHARE partner-country as late as 1996.
Macedonia became full participant in the
Stabilization and Association Process, and the 2000
PHARE National Programme and the CARDS pro-
gramme for 2001 were moulded around the priori-
ties identified by Stabilization and Association
Agreement.' According to the SAA co-operation with
the EU will be developed over the transitional pe-
riod often years following its entry into force. Mac-
edonian Government has developed a National Ac-
tion Plan and set up the strategic priorities guiding
medium to long-term actions. The Republic of Mac-
edonia applied for membership of the EU on 22
March 2004. On May 2004, the Council of Minis-
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ters requested the European Commission to prepare
an opinion on the application. Therefore the proc-
ess, which could lead the Republic of Macedonia to
joining EU, was opened.
We are arguing here that developing a more
targeted and comprehensive regional conflict preven-
tion policy (SAP) of the EU (not excluding other
regional and international institutions) as well as
developing local ownership and responsibility for the
process are preconditions for stability, security and
development. Given the fact that the process of demo-
cratic transition is not straightforward this article will
open the specifics of the post conflict security chal-
lenges in Macedonia and the preventive approach of
the EU in overcoming post-conflict peacebuilding
challenges.
2. The challenges for
peacebuilding and conflict
prevention
Very often it happens that the key figures of
the academic and policy making communities in
Macedonia disagree on the issues of public concern.
Consequently it appears that the task of following
the origin of the problem in question and connecting
different conceptions is more easily said than done.
The confusion surrounding the utilization of this
endeavour appears not only because of contesting
theoretical and policy paradigms but also because of
at least two of more accompanying factors: one of
them, the predominantly ethnically motivated indi-
vidual or community perceptions on the problem and
the second, the position of the international actors
that also claims for "ownership" over the issue.
The 2001 crisis in the Republic of Macedonia
also becomes a subject of such endeavours. There-
fore at least three 'ownership' attempts appeared as
a consequence of various explanations and justifica-
tions of the reasons for the conflict and the use of
violence by different actors. But the explanation (pre-
dominantly ethnic Macedonian) that criminal and
ethnic political agendas have found common ground
differs from the explanation (predominantly ethnic
Albanian) that poor respect for human rights and
minority status thereof has been the primary sources
of the conflict. Judging by the position taken by the
international community vis-r-vis the Macedonian
conflict, it seemed that this conflict was similar if
not identical to the other Yugoslav conflicts. Weather
or not that was truly the case was irrelevant, since
the already 'tested medicines,' (from the other Yu-
goslav conflicts) offered acceptable if not desirable
remedy. The ethnic radicalism and nationalism, hu-
man rights violation and weak state institutions have
created the international actor's explanatory agenda.
The confronting internal and external dis-
course over the root causes of the conflict or about
immediate causes of the crisis have reduced the
ground for reaching commonly acceptable explana-
tion, commonly supported solution or agenda, for
that matter, of a post-conflict priorities. Therefore it
is not incorrect to observe that on the Macedonian
post-conflict peace building agenda there are as many
issues and priorities as different "interveners" and
stakeholders.
However, the quest for security within and
around the Macedonian state and society was nei-
ther closed nor irrelevant issue for the entire period
of its independence. But paradoxically enough up to
the crisis and the armed conflict in 2001 the external
security concerns dominated the domestic ones. Even
when the challenge to enhance internal security and
stability was perceived as one of a higher priority
(as it was before and during the Kosovo crisis), or as
the challenge reached a critical level (as it was dur-
ing the period of the armed conflict) the problem
remained silent (at least on political and structural
level).
The situation remained contradictory: Al-
though the officials warnings about increase in ille-
gal arms transfer and firearm related criminal activi-
ties became more serious if not alarming and the need
for improving public security became more obvious
the attention and the support of local and interna-
tional actors over this issue remained low. What ad-
ditionally gave the bitter taste to the overall problem
was the predominantly ethnic perspective on almost
any specific case orland action performed by the in-
stitutions responsible for the maintenance of the pub-
lic security. Accordingly, the post-conflict public
security management has remained trapped in the
contradiction that more efficient public security
management will disrupt or even endanger
interethnic relations.
3. Macedonia had to handle
transitional challenges
The fact that Macedonia was born almost
"painlessly" (without any armed violence) from the
former Yugoslav federation could not have been used
long as a key and the only investment into the proc-
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ess of transition and democracy building. This was
not possible not only because Macedonia had to han-
dle huge amount of transitional challenges but be-
cause at the same time it had to refrain itself from
the influences of the regional spirals of violence.
However, the efforts of the international and local
actors in providing military security proved to be an
insufficient tool for removing the various forms of
direct violence, deterring its contagious effects and
sustaining the overall feeling of security (especially
in endorsing various aspects of public security).'
Weak state institutions, limited economic potentials,
political parties of ethnic origin, multi-ethnicity in
search of balance of ethnic power, inefficient and
politicized governance that have characterized pro-
tracted transitional period prevented the citizens from
possible access to democratic institutions and rule
of law. The internal security actors, unintentionally
or not, have supported the situation of protracted
democratic transition and hibernation within the
Macedonian society. They did it simply by sharing
its traditional security function with, and more or
less relying on, the presence of international actors
as a security guarantees. Instead of providing secu-
rity while supporting and simultaneously becoming
a part of the processes of democratization they have
also suffered transitional weaknesses.
The gloomy internal political and security situ-
ation in touch with the contiguous effects of the
Kosovo crisis in 2001 was easily triggered and turned
into serious political and military crisis. After six
months of uncertainty and armed conflict between
the Macedonian security forces and the National
Liberation Army (NLA), the Framework Agreement
(FA) was signed in August 2001. It put an end to the
armed confrontations and provided a ground for con-
stitutional and political reforms that were considered
significant part of the political process of
peacebuilding as well as for addressing the issue of
police reforms as a part of the process of introduc-
ing democratic policing.'
However, after the signing of the FA the list
of pre-conflict open dilemmas did not become shorter
nor the security situation eased. But if the attention
is on the internal security and the risks for the hu-
man and public security then the central themes are:
increased criminal activities with ethnic and trans-
border dimensions; illegal arms transfer, smuggling
and stocking of light weapons; illegal human traf-
ficking and criminalization of human trafficking;
organized crime and corruption; recruitment and
mobilization of irregular groups; criminal attacks on
members of the Police Forces. 4
The Framework Agreement and the
Stabilization and Association Agreement with EU
(SAA) are the two strategic documents that are to
channel the conflict prevention strategy and opera-
tional and long-term goals of security sector reforms
(SSR). The SAA in the part of the Justice and Home
Affairs and the CARDS Program set up a ground for
more sustainable and comprehensive process of re-
forms concerning public security management. This
program could become a turning point in establish-
ing local ownership in the process of reforms and
capacity development in the public security sector.
Consequently, more organized approach toward the
Police reforms commenced in March 2002. A com-
bined team of international and local experts pre-
pared complex strategic documents that were adopted
consequently: Strategy for Police Reform (August
2003), National Action Plan for Police Reform (Janu-
ary 2004), Strategy for Integrated Border Manage-
ment (January 2004), National Action Plan for Mi-
gration and Asylum (December 2002), National Ac-
tion Plan for Fight against the Organized Crime. The
Strategy for Police Reform refers to the process of
reform as to a comprehensive and complex process
of building the Police architecture suitable for a
democratic society based on the principles of the rule
of law and respect and protection of the basic hu-
man rights. Decentralization of the Police organiza-
tion and transfer of the function to their local units
is one of the key principles that should contribute
and rebuild the trust and efficiency of the Police.
This process, according to some suggestions, should
be parallel with the process of accession of Macedo-
nia into EU.
4. Local or international
ownership over the post-
-conflict peacebuilding
The presence and the mandate of different in-
ternational actors significantly influenced the
peacebuilding process in Macedonia. Beside differ-
ent theoretical interpretations of peacebuilding as a
post-conflict technique aimed at rebuilding social
infrastructure and creating basic conditions for se-
curity this concept in Macedonia (at least from the
perspective of academic community) has been
viewed as a pre-conflict as well. The early role of
the OSCE monitoring mission and the High Com-
missioner on National Minorities in confidence build-
ing process in Macedonia, and later the presence of
the UN mission (UNPREDEP) and its positive con-
tribution to state stability largely have developed
positive public perceptions and attitudes towards the
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contribution of the mission. In contrast, the presence
of NATO extraction mission before the Kosovo in-
tervention has raised public suspicions that peace and
stability in the country could be easily endangered.
The mildewing of the forces up to four times size of
the Macedonian Army has additionally complicated
the perceptions of the security in the country while
the meaning of the security reached controversial
dimensions: who is actually responsible for the se-
curity of the state and its citizens, and from what
kind of threats?
In sum the general observations about the role
played by the international community in Macedo-
nia before, during and after the crisis in 2001 is that
it is both ambitious and ambiguous. That is to say,
on the one hand the engagement of the international
community in resolving the crisis in 2001 deserves
appreciation on the other hand the oversight of the
local realities for different reasons continues.
After the FA has been signed the country en-
tered a fragile post conflict situation. In order to bol-
ster the turning point towards peacebuilding NATO
agreed to ease the process of voluntary collection of
weapons handed over by the NLA. The expectations
of NATO officials and the Macedonian citizens were
different. While the citizens expected disarmament
of former combatants as precondition and a sign of
commitment to the peace process the main expecta-
tion and contribution of the mission from the per-
spective of NATO officials was "only" to express its
support to the Ohrid Agreement rather than complete
disarmament. The Essential Harvest was proclaimed
successful after collecting of 3,000 pieces of weap-
ons. This was unacceptably low number for most of
the internal peacebuilding actors and the broader
public. In their opinion disarmament was an unfin-
ished job. 5 As mentioned earlier in this article the
problem of illegal weapons is one of the core prob-
lems in removing the sources of violence from the
Macedonian society and the broader region.
NATO issued the second mission (TFF) im-
mediately after the termination of the Essential Har-
vest with official mandate to protect international
monitors. The operation Allied Harmony followed
and lasted until March 2003. The mandate of the
mission was to protect the OSCE and EU monitors
and to advise the Government in the process oftak-
ing security control over the country. Considering
that the total duration of these missions was approxi-
mately eight months they can be easily described as
a quick fix missions. In local experts opinion the
unfinished process of disarmament and collection of
illegal weapons has generated the challenges both
for the international monitors and the citizens.
The EU led missions Concordia and Proxima
followed the NATO missions. The first one had more
characteristics of a monitoring than of a peacekeep-
ing mission but the second one is a new type of po-
lice mission. EUPOL Proxima is a part of the wider
EU strategy of promotion of reforms and contribu-
tion to the stability and the rule of law in the region
within the objectives of the Stabilization and Asso-
ciation process. The purpose of the mission is to as-
sist the local authorities in Macedonia which iden-
tify the organized crime as the main challenge for
the public security in the country. Assistance is to be
provided in the process of development of police
forces according to the international and European
standards. Under the EU-CARDS program the re-
forms in Macedonia are supported in the following
areas: Administration of justice (supporting justice
and prosecution reforms); Police reform (support-
ing strategy for Police reform and training); Inte-
grated Border Management (strengthening the bor-
der control and creating the Border Police Service);
Customs (assistance in administrative capacity build-
ing to help the fight against fraud, corruption and
organized crime); Asylum and Migration (develop-
ment of National Action Plan for Migration and Asy-
lum and the Law on the Movement and Residence
of Foreigners); Fight against crime (strengthening
strategies and developing capacity to fight against
money laundering and drug related crimes)." Accord-
ing to some police officials the program is compre-
hensive and ambitious but immediate improvements
or results are les likely to happen in the short terms.
The approach should rather be viewed as a long-term
process of progressive implementation of tools that
will be recognized as appropriate for the local con-
text.
5. Conclusion
The peacebuilding process in Macedonia can
be marked as a challenging and a long-lasting proc-
ess that started after the peaceful dissolution of the
former Yugoslavia. The fact that serious violence and
internal crisis have appeared only in 2001 and that
the international community have directly introduced
the post-conflict peacebuilding strategy (i.e. Frame-
work Agreement) must not be misused. By taking
the position that the peace building followed the in-
tervention, the process could be easily Iformally but
not substantially divided, because this process has
the characteristics and downsides immanent for de-
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mocracy in transition but also for a post-conflict so-
ciety. Therefore the fact that armed violence in Mac-
edonia took place in 2001 should not be misused for
the creation of unnatural or mechanical divisions of
this process. The armed violence is not the only form
of violence that threatens the peace and the public
security. The untraditional threats for the security in
Macedonia have derived from the regional complex-
ity as well as from within the country. The problem
of the public security has not received adequate at-
tention until the 2001 crisis. Special attention was to
be paid to the dramatic increase of the criminal ac-
tivities, corruption, and armed related crimes, such
as illegal weapon trafficking. Another characteristic
1 Macedonia signed the Stabilization and Association Agree-
ment with the EU and its member states in 2001.
2 Macedonia was granted gratis period while the UN preventive
peacekeeping mission was keeping a bird eye on the military
and political developments around and within the country in or-
der to prevent spillover of conflicts and to upgrade the broader
international peacemaking process in the Former Yugoslavia.
The public opinion has positively estimated the contribution of
the UNPREDEP for the stability of the country. More detailed
explanation of the public opinion attitudes towards the mission
has been presented in Georgieva L.: "Preventive Deployment:
Missing Link Between Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding",
paper presented at 40th Annual ISA Conference, Washington
D.C., USA, 16-20 February, 1999
3 Key aspects of the FA related to the police were directed to
address better representation of the ethnic communities (mostly
Albanian) in the police, redeployment of ethnically mixed police
patrols to the crisis areas, retraining of the police and introduc-
tion of community policing and restructuring of the police.
4 The Mol statistics for the period 1991-2001 on firearm - re-
lated criminal offences and the number of offenders confirms
is that the perceptions of the public security threats
vary according to ethnicity and according to the fact
that the citizens are more sensitive to specific non-
traditional threats (corruption and organized crime)
than the Government considers its priority. The FA
introduced by the international community has initi-
ated the process of the reforms in the public security
area. The EU CARDS program extends and enhances
the process. The complete implementation of the
anticipated programs that refer to various areas of
the public security and the professional and efficient
functioning of the public security institutions will
enhance the 'local ownership' over the public secu-
rity management.
NOTES
the direct relation between SALW supply and the crime rate.
According to the Safeworld report violent crime has risen signifi-
cantly since the elections in 2002 - 32 murders have been regis-
tered within one-year period, mainly in the Tetovo area.
www.safeworld.co.uk
The recent official report issued by the Ministry of Interior con-
firmed the rise of the indicators of crime (in numbers and per-
centage for the nine months of 2004 compared with the same
period last year). Illegal firearms trafficking increased during the




6 EUPOL Proxima is comprised of 200 police and civilian legal
experts. It operates at central Mol, regional and local level. Ap-
proximately 150 international police officers are divided between
the crises areas of Kumanovo, Tetovo, and Gostivar. The armed
component of the mission is composed of French Gendarmerie.
Duration of the mission has been prolonged since December
2005.
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